Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America

Book Name : Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America_x000D_
Stealing for the Team

By by Daniel W. Gingerich

Sub Title : Stealing for the Team

Written by : by Daniel W. Gingerich

Subject Category : Business

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about this book

An important question for the health and longevity of democratic governance is how institutions may be fashioned to prevent electoral victors from drawing on the resources of the state to perpetuate themselves in power. This book addresses the issue by examining how the structure of electoral institutions - the rules of democratic contestation that determine the manner in which citizens choose their representatives - affects political corruption, defined as the abuse of state power or resources for campaign finance or party-building purposes. To this end, the book develops a novel theoretical framework that examines electoral institutions as a potential vehicle for political parties to exploit the state as a source of political finance. Hypotheses derived from this framework are assessed using an unprecedented public employees' survey conducted by the author in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile. Cambridge University Press; December 2013 ISBN 9781107596948 Read online, or download in secure PDF or secure EPUB format Title: Political Institutions and Party-Directed Corruption in South America Author: Daniel W. Gingerich Imprint: Cambridge University Press Subject categories Business > Finance History > Latin America Political Science ISBNs 9781107040441 9781107596948 9781107703063 In The Press 'Gingerich's book is a valuable addition to studies on corruption and serves as an excellent example of high-quality institutional analysis. By showing that ballot structure affects corruption, he demonstrates that institutions affect the outcome of interest through different mechanisms. Assessing their overall impact, therefore, requires taking all of them into consideration. Gingerich collected new data for the book and offers what is probably the most sophisticated treatment of corruption I have seen in the comparative literature. The chapter 'Institutional Design and the Case for Mechanism-Based Analysis' is the best exposition I have ever seen of what comparative institutional analysis should be. This is a great book!' José Cheibub, Boeschenstein Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

About The authore

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Related subjects

Business - Finance History - Latin America Political Science

ISBN

9781107040441 - 9781107596948 - 9781107703063

In The Press:

'Gingerich's book is a valuable addition to studies on corruption and serves as an excellent example of high-quality institutional analysis. By showing that ballot structure affects corruption, he demonstrates that institutions affect the outcome of interest through different mechanisms. Assessing their overall impact, therefore, requires taking all of them into consideration. Gingerich collected new data for the book and offers what is probably the most sophisticated treatment of corruption I have seen in the comparative literature. The chapter 'Institutional Design and the Case for Mechanism-Based Analysis' is the best exposition I have ever seen of what comparative institutional analysis should be. This is a great book!' José Cheibub, Boeschenstein Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Imprint

Cambridge University Press